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Introduction
For the past three decades Denis Wood has explored the
nature and power of maps; how maps are designed, used,
and understood, the role of maps in society; and
cartographic theory more broadly. His collaboration
with John Fels, The Natures of Maps, furthers this project
and seeks to detail both the nature of maps and the nature
of maps. For Wood and Fels, ontological thinking
about cartography has been fixated on the nature of
maps. They illustrate this argument with reference to
Arthur Robinson and J.B. Harley, two cartographic
theorists with very different ideas about the ontology of
maps – maps as objective truths and maps as social
constructions. Wood and Fels argue that, despite their
differences, Robinson and Harley both conceive of a map
as having an inherent truth (they note that for Harley the
map itself remains ideologically neutral, with ideology
bound to the subject of the map and not the map itself).
Wood and Fels reject this position to argue that the
map itself, its very make-up and construction – its self-
presentation and design, its symbol set and categorization,
its attendant text and supporting discourse – is ideolog-
ically loaded to convey a particular message. In so doing, a
map does not simply represent the world, it produces the
world. To illustrate their argument, they use the example
of the nature of a map – how the supposedly neutral,
objective natural world is produced by maps –
to demonstrate how maps produce nature rather than
reflect it.
The Argument
The Natures of Maps seeks to extend Harley’s ontological
musing to make the case that a map does not simply
represent the world through an ideological frame but,
rather, ‘‘creates ideology . . . transforms the world into
ideology’’ (190). In other words, like others including
John Pickles (2004), Wood and Fels make the case that
maps are not representations but inscriptions – they
capture something of the world while simultaneously
doing work in the world; they precede and produce the
territory they represent. They conclude that ‘‘the map
is nothing more than a vehicle for the creation
and conveying of authority about, and ultimately over,
territory’’ (190). This authority, they continue, is asserted
through spatial/meaning propositions the map makes –
‘‘this is there’’ (190). Maps do work in the world by
exclaiming such propositions, which Wood and Fels term
‘‘postings.’’ Posting is the means by which an attribute is
recognized as a valid class of attribute (in their case, some
class of the natural world) and is spatialized; the means
by which the nature of maps (is – category) and the nature
of maps (there – sign) conjoin to create a unified
spatial ontology (this/there). However, the map extends
beyond spatial ontology by enabling higher-order propo-
sitions – ‘‘this is there and therefore it is also’’ (191) – to
link things in places into a relational grid.
The power of this spatial propositional framework Wood
and Fels argue is affirmed through its call to authority – of
being an objective reference object that is prescriptive,
not descriptive (that is, the map prescribes – produces
and reaffirms – territory rather than describing territory).
Authority is conveyed through what they term
the ‘‘paramap.’’ A paramap is the combination of
‘‘perimap’’ and ‘‘epimap.’’ The perimap consists of
the production surrounding a map: the quality of the
paper, the professionalism of the design, the title, legend,
scale, cartouches, its presentation, and so on. The epimap
consists of the discourse circulating around a map,
designed to shape its reception: advertisements, letters
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to reviewers, endorsements, lectures, articles, and so on.
Together, perimap and epimap work to position the map
in a certain way and to lend it the authority to do work in
the world.
Because maps are systems of propositions and are
prescriptive, Wood and Fels contend, map creation
should not be solely about presenting information
through attractive spatial representations, as advocated
by the majority of cartographic textbooks (which borrow
heavily from the traditions of graphic design). Instead,
they suggest, map design should be about the
‘‘construction of meaning as a basis for action’’ (194).
They propose turning to cognitive linguistics to rethink
map design as ‘‘cognitive cartographics.’’ Cognitive
linguistics examines the ways in which words activate
neural assemblages and open up ‘‘thinking spaces’’ in the
mind, within which meaning is constructed by linking
present information with past knowledge. Wood and Fels
contend that maps perform like words, likewise firing up
thinking spaces. Employing cognitive cartographics, they
suggest, will create a non-representational approach to
map design, focused on meaning construction and not on
graphic design and the nature of signs. It will also enable
cartographic theory to move beyond the compartmenta-
lized thinking that has divided map-making from map
use by providing a more holistic framework. In other
words, both map design and map reading can be
understood through a cognitive cartographics framework.
Critique
While The Nature of Maps has ideas that do advance our
thinking about maps – especially the discussion of
paramaps and cognitive cartographics – it also has a
number of shortcomings that invite critique. In setting
out this critique and advancing a different conception of
how we can productively rethink cartographic theory,
I am aware that Wood and Fels’s contribution to this issue
of Cartographica is the first chapter of a book. As a result,
my critique is limited to the ideas and discussion in that
chapter alone, and I have had to assume that the
dominant ideas of the book are outlined therein. It may
well be the case that aspects of my critique are addressed
elsewhere in the book. That said, I am confident that
Wood and Fels and I differ significantly with respect to
our ontological understanding of cartography. I have four
points of concern.
First, the piece is curiously detached from the recent
literature on cartographic thought. Those unfamiliar with
the field might be left with the impression that Wood and
Fels are the lone scholars pushing the ontological
boundaries of cartography beyond the work of Harley.
This is simply not the case, and much thinking has been
done on the ontology of maps since Harley’s untimely
death by Jeremy Crampton, John Pickles, Denis Cosgrove,
Martin Dodge, Mathew Edney, John Krygier, Chris
Perkins, and others. The growing fields of critical
cartography and critical GIS are testimony to this.
Whether intentional or not, the lack of any sustained
engagement with the work of other contemporary
cartographic theorists works to silence them and to
position Wood and Fels in a particular way – as the next
(and only) logical step in cartographic theory after Harley.
Given that this is a scholarly piece, aimed primarily at a
scholarly audience, I think it would have been more
productive to give a detailed overview of other theorists’
thinking in the post-Harley period and of how the ideas in
The Natures of Maps build upon, develop, and differ from
them. In particular, an engagement with Edney’s (1993)
notion of a non-progressivist history of cartography,
Crampton’s (2003) discussion of cartography as a set
of ontic knowledges, and Pickles’ (2004) positioning of
cartography as a post-representational science would have
been useful, especially as Wood and Fels’s ideas are highly
related.
Second, maps themselves, within Wood and Fels’s
analysis, seem to be taken for granted and quite tightly
defined. Interestingly, the book does not start with an
examination of what a map is; this is taken as a given.
Instead, it asks us to reconsider the nature of what we
supposedly already know by troubling accepted carto-
graphic theory. The problem with this approach is
twofold. First, the map continues to enjoy ontological
security – despite being revealed as ideological, rhetorical,
relational, the map remains secure as a coherent,
knowable, stable product: a map. As I detail below,
I believe that the map enjoys no such ontological security
and that, rather than simply accepting what a map is, we
need to shift our ontological questioning to query how
maps become. Second, maps, for Wood and Fels, are
essentially paper based and produced by professional
cartographers. While this definition does provide a
platform from which to critique the nature of maps, it
also produces a very limited view of maps, bounded by
the strictures of Western scientific thought. As a result,
the discussion largely ignores the rich literature on
counter-mappings, performative mappings, map hacking
and mash-ups, indigenous mapping, and postcolonial
critiques of Western cartography. A thoughtful discussion
on these kinds of mappings and critiques would have
provided a useful alternative means to think through
the nature of maps to supplement and augment their
discussion regarding truth, ideology, and nature. It would
also have helped break the discussion out of its narrow,
conventional, Anglo-American frame.
Third, Wood and Fels have a very narrowly defined
notion of Nature. While they seek to develop a more
sophisticated ontological understanding of maps, they do
so using a very simple ontology of Nature as a foil.
For them, Nature is basically real and non-ideological; it is
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the non-cultural world we inhabit – animals, vegetation,
landscape, soils, weather, and so on. The result is that
while maps are engaged with conceptually, Nature is dealt
with descriptively. Thus, while the text seeks to challenge
our conception of maps, it does little to challenge our
understanding of nature, merely putting a basic descrip-
tive taxonomy on it (essentially, it lists the Nature maps
map – threatened Nature, Nature as threat, Nature as
spectacle, Nature as cornucopia, Nature as tchotchke,
Nature as paradigm, Nature as mystery, Nature as park).
And yet Nature is presently one of the most hotly debated
concepts in social sciences. The rather essentialist
characterization used by Wood and Fels has been
challenged by approaches such as political economy,
political ecology, cultural ecology, and post-structuralism,
so that theorists now discuss Nature as actant, more-
than-human, post-human, hybrid natures, culture-
natures, and so on. In my view, thinking through how
maps produce Nature needed more conceptual work on
the kind of Nature maps produced, because, just as Wood
and Fels cannot accept maps as objective and truthful,
neither should Nature be accepted as real and non-
ideological. I accept that working two large, relational,
contingent, and non-essential concepts through each
other would require a great deal of conceptual thinking,
but the logic of their work concerning maps would, it
seems to me, to demand such a process.
Fourth, The Natures of Maps largely ignores technology
and technological advancements in map-making and the
handling and processing of spatial data. And yet, while the
relationship is certainly not a purely deterministic one,
mapping technologies do shape the processing of spatial
data and analysis and, thus, the production and
consumption of maps. The spatial data that underpin
map construction are now almost universally generated
(note, not collected) by sensing technologies such as
remote sensing, GPS, LIDAR, and laser-based surveying
equipment. All this information is no longer stored as lists
of coordinates and lines and shades on paper maps;
rather, it resides as 0s and 1s in massive relational
databases, brought into life as maps by computer code
running sophisticated routines and algorithms. As such,
spatial data processing is undertaken by specialist software
and geographic information systems that analyse and
manipulate stored data and output them in a variety of
geovisualizations. The maps produced are fundamentally
different from traditional paper maps in a number of
respects: they can be produced as a whole in an instant (as
opposed to the gradual building of a paper map); they are
fleeting and disposable (they can be updated, redesigned,
and rejected by the click of a mouse); they are shaped by
the processing power of the computer used to produce
them, including automated processes affecting design and
map content; and, in many cases, they are interactive and
dynamic – that is, the user can query and manipulate
them, and they can be updated in real time as new data
become available. The real-time distribution of such data
across global networks enables the production of context-
sensitive maps allied with other attribute data (as with
online mapping sites, local-based services (LBS), and a
variety of mash-ups) and has opened up a range of
creative interventions that challenge paper-based notions
of mapping and maps. In short, the radical new ways
in which spatial data are now stored, manipulated, and
outputted and the increasing sophistication of software
tools have fundamentally changed how maps are pro-
duced and who produces them. There is little evidence
that The Natures of Maps grapples with what new
technologies mean for how we think about maps, largely,
I suspect, because the idea of a map – what a map is – is
thought to exist independently of how maps come to be.
This seems to me a serious shortcoming that demands a
different kind of ontological thought.
The Practices of Mapping
In a recent article in Progress in Human Geography, Martin
Dodge and I propose a radical departure in ontological
thinking concerning maps: a shift from ontology
(how things are) to ontogenesis (how things become),
or from the nature of maps to the practices of mapping.
In short, we contend that maps have no ontological
security but, rather, are ontogenetic in nature; they are not
ontologically secure representations but, rather, a set of
unfolding practices. We argue that
[m]aps are of-the-moment, brought into being through
practices (embodied, social, technical), always re-made every
time they are engaged with; mapping is a process of constant
re-territorialization. As such, maps are transitory and fleeting,
being contingent, relational and context-dependent.
Maps are practices – they are always mappings; spatial
practices enacted to solve relational problems (e.g., how best
to create a spatial representation, how to understand a
spatial distribution, how to get between A and B, and so on).
(Kitchin and Dodge 2007, 5)
From this perspective, we contend that the representation
shown in Figure 1 is not unquestioningly a map but,
rather, is a set of points, lines, and colours that is brought
into being as a map through mapping practices (an
inscription in a constant state of re-inscription). As such,
the map is (re)made every time mapping practices, such as
recognizing, interpreting, translating, and communicat-
ing, are applied to the pattern of ink. These mapping
practices give the map the semblance of an immutable
mobile (a stable and transferable form of knowledge that
allows them to be portable across space and time) and
ontological security because they are learned and
constantly reaffirmed. As Pickles explains,
The Practices of Mapping
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Maps work by naturalizing themselves by reproducing a
particular sign system and at the same time treating that sign
system as natural and given. But, map knowledge is never
naı¨vely given. It has to be learned and the mapping codes and
skills have to be culturally reproduced . . . The map opens a
world to us through systems and codes of sedimented,
acculturated knowledge. (2004, 60–61)
Maps do not, then, emerge in the same way for all
individuals. Rather, they emerge in context and through a
mix of creative, reflexive, playful, affective, and habitual
practices, affected by the knowledge, experience, and skill
of the individual to perform mappings and apply them in
the world. This applies as much to map-making as to map
reading. Thus, the map does not re-present the world or
make the world; it is a co-constitutive production between
inscription, individual, and world, a production that is
constantly in motion, always seeking to appear ontologi-
cally secure. Conceiving of maps in this way reveals that
they are never fully formed but emerge in process and are
mutable (they are remade, as opposed to mis-made,
misused, or misread).
Wood and Fels hint at this kind of thinking. For example,
on page 191 they state that ‘‘it is through the
simultaneous affirmation of these propositions that the
territory as such is brought into being.’’ On page 200 they
note, ‘‘eight natures . . . each hoisting itself off the page,
taking shape in the mental spaces of cognitive linguistics
as we read the map, as we unfold it, turn it over, and
refold it; as we bring it closer to our eyes or move it away;
as we scale its disguises with our fingers.’’ On page 195,
they explain that using cognitive linguistics allows them to
understand ‘‘the way meaning is constructed on the fly,
which is certainly the way we propose to understand –
and model – map reading, as a process in time, which
encourages the construction of certain kinds of meaning
and ultimately behavior.’’ They continue,
as we read the main map and the various elements of the
paramap – text, ancillary maps, title block, photo, scale
bar, graph – one or more mental spaces open up which
are structured . . . and linked under pressure from the
graphic structure, context, and culture to create a network
of spaces – one space opening up after another – through
which we move as we read and make sense of the map.
(195–6; italics original, bold my emphasis)
But what is clear from their analysis is that the map
remains curiously static while meaning and the world
unfold around it. It is territory and nature that are
beckoned into being, not the map – the map remains
ontologically secure at the same time that territory and
nature unfold through the work of the map. And yet what
Wood and Fels describe is the map in process – as a set of
unfolding practices.
I tentatively agree that cognitive linguistics does offer
potential for rethinking how maps are created and the
work that maps do – maps are created to construct
meaning and to solve spatial problems, and they do
open up thinking spaces – but I am not convinced that
Figure 1. Political map of the world, 2007. CIA World Factbook, web version, 2007.
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Wood and Fels have taken their own argument to
its logical conclusion. If the world is dynamic and
always coming into existence, and if map-making and
map reading are processes of cognitive cartographics, then
maps themselves are never static but are similarly dynamic
– always being beckoned into being; always mapping.
Likewise, I believe that the notion of paramaps is useful
but needs to be set within wider debates about the
production of knowledge and, especially, how discursive
regimes unfold in contingent and relational ways to
support or contest particular discourses. Here I think we
need to develop the kind of non-progressive geographical
genealogies of cartography proposed by Edney (1993)
and Crampton (2003), which carefully pick apart how the
discursive regime of cartography itself (the contested
domain of how to produce meaningful and effective
maps) has unfolded and mutated at different times and
places, how cartography has been employed within the
service of other discursive regimes (in the present period,
for example, within the regime of the ‘‘war on terror’’).
Table 1 summarizes what I see as the similarities and
differences in our thinking, along with a comparison to
Robinson and Harley.
In summary, while I think some of the ideas within The
Nature of Maps are useful, particularly cognitive
cartographics and the paramap, I think these concepts
need to be further developed within an ontogenetic
framework that recognizes that the map itself is beckoned
into being, and not just the work that it does in the world.
Such a reworking will provide a new point of departure
for radically rethinking cartography, so that, rather than
exploring the nature of maps, we will be examining the
practices of mapping.
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Table 1. Comparing different map ontologies.
Robinson Harley Wood and Fels Kitchin and Dodge
Maps as truth Maps as social constructions Maps as constructions that
produce the world
Mappings – spatial practices that
do work in the world
Representation (descriptive) Representation (descriptive) Inscription (prescriptive) Practices (relationally
prescriptive)
Essentialist Constructed Constructed Emergent
Map ontologically secure
(fully formed / immutable)
Map ontologically secure (fully
formed / immutable)
Map ontologically secure
(fully formed / immutable;
meaning mutable)
Mapping ontologically insecure
(emergent and mutable)
Inherent truth, non-
ideological
Inherent truth, ideology tied to
subject matter, not to map
Map fully ideologically loaded Ideology emergent, relational,
and emergent with context
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